Based on agency theory, the conflict of interest between owners and managers leads to agency costs. Laws related to corporate governance seek to mitigate these costs. Among Important tools in this area, the independence of the broad, ownership concentration, ownership structure and institutional ownership can be noted. This study aims to identify the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the timeliness of earnings, with an emphasis on financial distress in listed companies on the Stock Exchange in Tehran. Thus, 128 companies were investigated from 1387 to 1392. The timeliness of corporate earnings was measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric. At First, firms with financial distress of healthy financial firms were separated, using by the adjusted model of Altman. SPSS, Eviews, and Excel have been used to analyze data and testing research hypothesis.  Then the test of the research hypotheses by multiple regression analysis using generalized least squares (GLS) through a combination of data was performed. The results show that the percentages of independence of the board and institutional ownership have a negative signifcant relationship with timeliness of earnings. And concentrations of ownership, ownership structure have significant and positive relationship with the timeliness of earnings. Also in firms with financial distress, the percentage of independence of the board, the percentage of institutional ownership and concentration of ownership have significant positive relationship with the timeliness of their earnings but there isn’t any significant relationship between ownership structure and timeliness of earnings.